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Article 4

Pro Bono Publico: Issues and Implications
by DebraBurke, * Reagan McLaurin,**
and James W. Pearce***
The lawyer is standing at the gate to Heaven and St. Peter is
listening to his sins . . . the list goes on for quite awhile. The
lawyer objects and begins to argue his case. He admits all these
things, but argues, "Wait, I've done some charity in my life
also." St. Peter looks in his book and says, "Yes, I see. Once
you gave a dime to a panhandler and once you gave an extra
nickel to the shoeshine boy, correct?" The lawyer gets a smug
look on his face and replies, "Yes." St. Peter turns to the angel
next to him and says, "Give this guy 15 cents and tell him to go
to hell."'
I. INTRODUCTION
Lawyer bashing is a common activity of the Nineties. The
profession is seen as a "dour and greedy [one] that enriches itself
through legal subtleties [which lawyers] have created.",2 Although
anti-lawyer sentiment and distrust of lawyers as a class was present
even in colonial America,3 the public perception of the legal profession
today is probably at its nadir. For example, a recent survey by the
American Bar Association ("A.B.A.") revealed that lawyers had a
favorability rating of only forty percent. 4 Only stockbrokers and
politicians tested lower, with approval ratings of twenty-eight percent
and twenty-one percent, respectively. 5 In fact, the approval rating for
lawyers was higher among people who were the least likely to come
into direct personal contact with them, while their approval rating was
lowest among those who were most likely to come into contact with
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I. LARRY WILDE, THE ULTIMATE LAWYER'S JOKE BOOK 10(1987).
2. In re Amendments to Rules Regulating the Fla. Bar and Rules of Judicial Admin.,
598 So. 2d 41, 59 (Fla. 1992) (Kogan, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
3. Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 826-27 (1975).
4. Gary A. Hengstler, Vox Populi: The Public Perception of Lawyers: A.B.A. Poll,
A.B.A. J., Sept. 1993, at 60, 62. Teachers had a favorability rating of 84%;
pharmacists, 81%; police officers, 79%; doctors, 71%; accountants, 60%; and bankers,
*

**

56%. Id.
5. Id.
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them.6
General complaints concerning attorneys include that attorneys lack
caring and compassion, and that the profession fails to promote and
police ethical behavior. 7 Another common complaint relates to tasteless advertising by attorneys,8 a situation that many bar associations
are attempting to remedy through regulation 9 In response to questions
about what the profession could do to promote a more positive
perception, forty-three percent of the people surveyed by the A.B.A.
said that providing free legal services to the poor, in other words, providing pro bono services,' 0 would improve the public image of the
legal profession." Indeed, one attorney characterizes pro bono work
as the vaccine which renders him immune to lawyer jokes and claims it
provides an opportunity for the2 profession to counteract the negative,
distorted image thrust upon it.'
This Article will first explore the historical, constitutional, practical,
and ethical justifications for pro bono obligations. 3 This Article will
then examine the controversies surrounding mandatory pro bono
proposals.14 Next, this Article will review current pro bono programs."' Finally, this Article will analyze empirically the relationship
between the pro bono work performed by the largest United States
firms and their financial
performance, organizational structure, and
6
membership.
minority
6. Id. Minorities, the unemployed, members of low-income households, and adults
under the age of 30 felt more favorably toward lawyers; whereas, upper middle class
white-collar workers who were college graduates, that is, those persons most likely to
be associated personally with lawyers, felt disfavorably toward them. Id.
7. Id.
8. Some advertising by attorneys is constitutionally protected speech under the First
Amendment and cannot be prohibited by the state. See, e.g., Shapero v. Kentucky State
Bar Ass'n, 486 U.S. 466 (1988); Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350 (1977).
9. See William E. Hornsby & Judith H. Shapiro, Advertising: States Revamp Their
Rules, 56 TEX. B.J. 1026 (1993) (reprinted by permission from Bar Leader, July-August
1992).
10. Pro bono or "pro bono publico," is defined as being for the public good, for the
welfare of the whole. BLACK'S LAW DIcTIONARY 1203 (6th ed. 1990).
1 . Hengstler, supra note 4, at 61. Other suggestions included volunteer in the drug
war (42%), prosecute criminals (39%), help draw agreements (33%), protect those
discriminated against (33%), promote mediation (32%), keep order in society (20%), and
defend the average person (17%). Id.
12. Mark E. Allen, Pro Bono Attorneys Do It For Free, WASH. ST. B. NEWS, Nov.
1991, at 21, 21.
13. See infra part 11.
14. See infra part 1I.
15. See infra part IV.
16. See infra part V & app. For an explanation as to why the study focused on large
firms, see infra note 114.
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II. THE PRO BONO OBLIGATIONS OF ATTORNEYS

Proponents of mandatory pro bono find support for legal service
obligations in historical, constitutional, practical, and ethical justifications.
A. HistoricalJustificationsfor Pro Bono Obligations
Historical justifications for requiring pro bono of attorneys include
the "officer of the court" argument and the closely related implied
consent theory. These theories hold that attorneys, as officers of the
court, must assist in the administration of justice:' 7 because of "the
lawyer's historical professional responsibility to represent the poor,"''
a lawyer implicitly consents to assume these obligations cum onere, or
as part of an onerous tradition, upon entering the profession. 9 Some
legal historians trace this burden to the ecclesiastical courts of the
thirteenth century; a° whereas, others find its root in the English courts
17. See, e.g., Ruckenbrod v. Mullins, 133 P.2d 325 (Utah 1943) (holding that
appointed attorneys have no right to compensation). Some states hold that, while an
attorney must serve, the attorney has a right to compensation. DeLisio v. Alaska Super.
Ct., 740 P.2d 437, 437 (Alaska 1987). See generally C.T. Drechsler, Annotation, Right
of Attorney Appointed By Court For Indigent Accused To, And Court's Power To Award,
Compensation By Public, In Absence of Statute Or Court Rule, 21 A.L.R. 3d 819 (1968).
18. In re D.B., 385 So. 2d 83, 92 (Fla. 1980).
19. See, e.g., United States v. Dillon, 346 F.2d 633, 635 (9th Cir. 1965), cert.
denied, 382 U.S. 978 (1966); In re Amendments to Rules Regulating the Fla. Bar and
Rules of Judicial Admin., 573 So. 2d 800, 806 (Fla. 1990); Weiner v. Fulton County,
148 S.E.2d 143, 146 (Ga. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 958 (1966); see also Mallard
v. United States Dist. Ct., 490 U.S. 296, 317 (1989) (Stevens, J., dissenting)
(obligation to participate in program providing representation for indigent litigants
existed since program was in operation when attorney was admitted to practice).
Learned professions, such as law, theology, and medicine, historically have been
characterized by a spirit of public service. For example, Dean Roscoe Pound described
the spirit of public service as motivating professionals to act even with no expectation
of reward, and asserting that, while gaining a livelihood was involved in all callings, it
was incidental to a professional calling. State Bar of Ariz. v. Arizona Land Title & Trust
Co., 366 P.2d 1,6 (Ariz. 1961) (quoting ROSCOE POUND, THE LAWYER FROM ANTIQUITY
TO MODERN TIMES 6, 10 (1953)). The practical effect of being characterized as a learned
profession was that historically federal antitrust laws were not applied actively to such
practitioners. See, e.g., Atlantic Cleaners & Dryers, Inc. v. United States, 286 U.S. 427
(1932) (discussing the Sherman Antitrust Act); FTC v. Raladam Co., 283 U.S. 643
(1931) (discussing the Federal Trade Commission Act); see generally Michael J.Kaplan,
Annotation, "Learned Profession" Exemption in Federal Antitrust Laws (15 U.S.C. §§ I
et seq.), 39 A.L.R. FED. 774 (1978); Craig C. Beles & Daniel W. Wyckoff, Comment,
The Washington Consumer Protection Act v. The Learned Professional, 10 GONZ. L.
REV. 435 (1975). Nevertheless, despite their common bond to professionalism and
Latin, lawyers and doctors do not share a pro bono obligation. But see Ronald H.
Silverman, Conceiving a Lawyer's Legal Duty to the Poor, 19 HOFSTRA L. REV. 885,
1013 (1991).
20. Zino 1.Macaluso, That's O.K., This One's On Me: A Discussion of the
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and their traditions. 2'
Nevertheless, some scholars find no merit in this "onerous tradition" rationale for uncompensated service.22 They reason that while
English sergeants-at-law, who had the exclusive right to practice in the
Court of Common Pleas, may have been considered to be officers of
the court, 23 modern attorneys more closely resemble English barristers, who were never considered to be officers of the court. 2a
B. ConstitutionalJustificationsfor Pro Bono Obligations
The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution guarantees
criminal defendants the right to counsel in federal prosecutions. 25 The
right to counsel has been made applicable to the states through the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.26 Because the right to
counsel in criminal cases is fundamental, an attorney must be provided
whether or not the accused has an ability to pay for the services to be
rendered. While the government must provide an attorney for an indigent defendant, the government does not have a commensurate
Responsibilities and Duties Owed by the Profession to Do Pro Bono Publico Work, 26
B.C. L. REV. 65, 66 (1992).
21. United States v. Dillon, 346 F.2d 633, 636-38 (9th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382
U.S. 978 (1966). In addition to this common law tradition, some early American
statutes codified the obligations. Id. at 637.
22. See Eugene R. Gaetke, Lawyers as Officers of the Court, 42 VAND. L. REV. 39
(1989); David L. Shapiro, The Enigma of the Lawyer's Duty to Serve, 55 N.Y.U. L. REV.
735 (1980); Howard A. Matalon, Note, The Civil Indigent's Last Chance for Meaningful
Access to the Federal Courts: The Inherent Power to Mandate Pro Bono Publico, 71 B.U.
L. REV. 545, 567-68 (1991).
23. Matalon, supra note 22, at 567.
24. See Shapiro, supra note 22, at 740-53. Unlike modern attorneys, sergeants-atlaw held public offices and sometimes were compensated by the government. Id. at 746.
See also Beth M. Coleman, Note, The Constitutionality of Compulsory Attorney
Service: The Void Left By Mallard, 68 N.C. L. REV. 575, 586 (1990). Whether or not
the English tradition, if it exists, was incorporated into American jurisprudence has also
been questioned. State ex rel. Scott v. Roper, 688 S.W.2d 757, 760-61 (Mo. 1985) (en
banc). The Supreme Court may not endorse the officer of the court doctrine as the sole
justification for an attorney's obligation to serve. See Mallard v. United States Dist.
Ct., 490 U.S. 296, 304 (1989); see also Matalon, supra note 22, at 564-65.
25. U.S. CONST. amend. VI. The amendment provides in pertinent part: "In all
criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to have the Assistance of
Counsel for his defence." Id.
26. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 342 (1963); see
also Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 (1972) (right to counsel when imprisonment
possible); In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967) (right to counsel for juveniles when
institutionalization possible); Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932) (right to counsel
in capital case). The conclusion that a lawyer is essential to a fair trial, arguably, might
even allow a state to constitutionally impose a lawyer upon an unwilling defendant. See
Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 832-33 (1975).
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obligation to pay the attorney to represent the defendant."
No constitutional right to have the assistance of counsel exists in
civil cases.28 In addition, it is still far from settled whether attorneys
may be constitutionally required to serve in civil disputes without
compensation.2 9 In 1892, Congress passed the In FormaPauperisAct
(the "Act") to open federal courts to indigent civil plaintiffs. 30 The Act
allows indigents to sue without liability for costs and allows judges to
assign counsel. 3' In Mallard v. United States District Court,32 the
27. State v. Davis, 153 S.E.2d 749, 756-57 (N.C.), cert. denied sub nom. Nivens v.
North Carolina, 389 U.S. 828 (1967); State v. Clifton, 172 So. 2d 657, 667-68 (La.
1965); see generally Kim Schimenti, Pro Choice for Lawyers in a Revised Pro Bono
System, 23 SETON HALL L. REV. 641, 653-72 (1993). Even nonresident attorneys may
be required to handle their share of indigent cases as a requirement for admission to a
state's bar. Barnard v. Thorstenn, 489 U.S. 546, 557-58 (1989). Arguably, however,
court-appointed attorneys need not pay the costs or expenses of maintaining a proper
defense. State ex rel. Wolff v. Ruddy, 617 S.W.2d 64, 67 (Mo. 1981) (en banc), cert.
denied, 454 U.S. 1142 (1982).
28. Caruth v. Pinkney, 683 F.2d 1044, 1048 (7th Cir. 1982) (per curiam), cert.
denied, 459 U.S. 1214 (1983); Watson v. Moss, 619 F.2d 775, 776 (8th Cir. 1980); see
also Lassiter v. Department of Social Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 25-27 (1981) (right to
appointed counsel exists only if litigant may lose physical liberty). Consequently,
legislatures have never been thought to have a duty to finance representation for civil
indigents as opposed to criminal indigents. Colbert v. Rickmon, 747 F. Supp. 518,
521 (W.D. Ark. 1990).
29. See, e.g., Colbert, 747 F. Supp. 518 (courts have no inherent power to compel
representation of civil rights plaintiffs without compensation); State ex rel. Scott v.
Roper, 688 S.W.2d 757, 769 (Mo. 1985) (en banc) (courts cannot compel civil
appointments without compensation); see generally Judy E. Zelin, Annotation, Court
Appointment of Attorney to Represent, Without Compensation, Indigent In Civil
Action, 52 A.L.R. 4th 1063 (1987) (discussing the divergence of views of requiring an
attorney to serve a civil appointment without compensation). Nevertheless, the rules of
a few federal district courts allow for the mandatory appointment of uncompensated
counsel in indigent civil cases. Deborah Graham, Mandatory Pro Bono: The Shape of
Things To Come?, A.B.A. J., Dec. 1987, at 62.
30. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)-(e) (1988). The title of the Act literally means "[iun the
character or manner of a pauper." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 779 (6th ed. 1990). The Act
provides in pertinent part:
(a) Any court of the United States may authorize the commencement,
prosecution or defense of any suit, action or proceeding, civil or criminal, or
appeal therein, without prepayment of fees and costs or security therefor, by a
person who makes affidavit that he is unable to pay such costs or give security
therefore;
(d) The court may request an attorney to represent any such person unable to
employ counsel and may dismiss the case if the allegation of poverty is
untrue, or if satisfied that the action is frivolous or malicious.
28 U.S.C. § 1915(a), (d).
31. Other statutes as well, both at the state and federal level, allow for the
appointment, and often the compensation, of attorneys in civil suits. See Carolyn
Elefant, Can Law Firms Do Pro Bono? A Skeptical View of Law Firms' Pro Bono
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Supreme Court was asked to interpret the Act to determine whether or
not federal district courts could compel appointment in civil cases.33 A
bare majority of five held that the use of the word "request" by Congress to describe the authority of courts negated any suggestion that
compulsory appointment was intended.34 By limiting its holding to the
statutory interpretation issue, however, the Court did not rule on the
constitutionality of compulsory assignments generally.35 Therefore,
while the government's interest in providing counsel under the Sixth
Amendment may be compelling and may outweigh the rights of the
individual attorney appointed in criminal cases,3 6 on balance the
government's interest in providing counsel to represent indigents in
civil suits may not be as compelling.37
Programs, 16 J. LEGAL PROF. 95, 117-19 (1991). Often, however, the legislative body
fails to establish a fund for payment of attorneys fees. See Bradshaw v. United States
Dist. Ct., 742 F.2d 515, 516 (9th Cir. 1984) ("Unfortunately Congress has not been as
generous in providing compensation for counsel as it has in authorizing court
appointments.").
32. 490 U.S. 296 (1989).
33. Mallard, 490 U.S. at 298. See generally Coleman, supra note 24 (examining the
Mallard decision in light of its legislative history and statutory language); Lisa M.
Windfeldt, Note, Pro Bono Representation-A Lawyer's Statutory Right to "Just Say
No": The End of Compelled Indigent Representation-Mallardv. United States District
Court, 25 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 647 (1990) (analyzing the impact of the Court's
decision in Mallard on an attorney's statute-based right to decline an indigent referral).
34. Mallard, 490 U.S. at 301-02. Ironically, Mallard argued that he should be
permitted to withdraw from the case to which he was appointed because forcing him to
represent indigent inmates in a complex trial would compel him to violate his ethical
obligation to take only those cases which he could handle competently. Id. at 299-300.
35. Id. at 306-08. The dissent argued that the Act embodied the historical authority of
courts to order counsel to represent indigent litigants. Id. at 314 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting). However, the Court did not rule on the inherent authority of courts to
compel appointment. Id. at 306-08. See infra notes 43-53 and accompanying text for a
discussion of the authority of a court's justification for mandating pro bono.
Justice Kennedy, in a concurring opinion, concluded that, while the Act did not
authorize compulsory appointments, the professional responsibility of lawyers obliged
them to answer the call. Id. at 310-11 (Kennedy, J., concurring). See infra notes 54-57
and accompanying text regarding lawyers' ethical responsibility.
The contingency fee system and one-way fee shifting statutes may inspire attorneys to
represent indigent plaintiffs in some civil cases. See Roger C. Cramton, Mandatory Pro
Bono, 19 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1113, 1117 (1991); Silverman, supra note 19, at 1094-99.
Judge Posner endorses the contingency fee system, arguing that the marketplace should
determine the availability of legal services based on the merit of the case. See Merritt v.
Faulkner, 697 F.2d 761, 769-71 (7th Cir.) (Posner, J., concurring in part, dissenting in
part), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 986 (1983).
36. For a discussion of the constitutional objections raised by attorneys to
mandatory pro bono proposals see infra notes 73-86 and accompanying text.
37. Arguably, in civil cases the interests of all parties should be balanced on a case
by case basis; however, mandatory pro bono programs do not allow such individualized
consideration.
See John C. Scully, Mandatory Pro Bono: An Attack on the
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C. PracticalJustificationsfor ProBono Obligations
One practical justification for requiring pro bono is the legal monopoly theory. According to the legal monopoly theory, States award
an exclusive monopoly to lawyers to represent the public in legal
matters. The monopoly power allows the States to license, control,
and regulate attorneys as well as to establish and maintain the rules of
access to the judicial system. Because attorneys receive an exclusive
franchise from the state which licenses them, lawyers must render pro
bono services or risk looking suspiciously like "the foxes ...establishing the rules of access to the hen house."38 Critics of this rationale
argue that mandating a public service obligation in exchange for the
privilege of exercising a degree of monopoly power is not a viable
justification given the competitive nature of the practice of law today. 39
Another practical consideration centers on the complexity of the
legal system. Some lawyers argue that the complexities of today's
procedural and substantive laws can be neither understood nor applied
effectively by a layperson; therefore, the absence of legal assistance is
equivalent to a denial of equal access to justice.' While lawyers may
not hold the keys to the courthouse doors exclusively, lawyers do help
preserve the rights of individuals,4 primarily because such rights are
adjudicated in an adversarial system in which effective representation
is of paramount importance.42 Therefore, lawyers are obligated to
Constitution, 19 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1229, 1243 (1991).
38. In re Amendments to Rules Regulating the Fla. Bar and Rules of Judicial Admin.,
598 So. 2d 41, 60 (Fla. 1992) (Kogan, J.,
concurring in part, dissenting in part).
39. Cramton, supra note 35, at 1134-36 (notion that protection from internal and
external competition provides practitioners with material security and makes possible
uncompensated public service is fanciful); Jonathon R. Macey, Mandatory Pro Bono:
Comfort for the Poor or Welfare for the Rich?, 77 CORNELL L. REV. 1115, 1122 (1992)
(entry restrictions in the form of state bar licensing rules do not justify imposing a
mandatory pro bono requirement on lawyers currently in practice).
40. See In re Amendments to Rules Regulating the Fla. Bar and Rules of Judicial
Admin., 598 So. 2d at 55-58 (Kogan, J.,concurring in part, dissenting in part). In the
context of criminal proceedings, the Supreme Court has acknowledged that "even the
intelligent and educated layman has small and sometimes no skill in the science of law."
Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 69 (1932). But see Caruth v. Pinkney, 683 F.2d 1044
(7th Cir. 1982) (court's refusal to appoint counsel in civil suit should not be disturbed
on appeal since plaintiff, a prison law clerk, had access to prison library and basic
understanding of the judicial process).
41. Victor Marrero, Committee to Improve the Availability of Legal Services-Final
Report to the Chief Judge of the State of New York, 19 HOFSTRA L. REV. 755, 782 (1991)
[hereinafter Marrero Report].
42. Matalon, supra note 22, at 562. Adversarial systems allow some citizens to
triumph at the expense of other citizens. Therefore, while grocers may not make the
condition of the hungry worse by selling groceries to people who can afford them, the
same observation is not necessarily true with respect to the commercial activities of
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assist those who cannot afford legal assistance in gaining access to the
legal system, both to vindicate individual rights and to advance the
system itself.
An additional rationale for conscripting attorneys into pro bono
service lies in the inherent authority of the court itself to order such
service as a condition of practice. 43 The state judiciary has the authority to regulate the professional conduct of attorneys." In In re
Hunoval,4 5 an attorney was appointed to represent an indigent defendant charged with a capital offense. 46 The defendant was convicted
and the attorney petitioned the state supreme court for a stay of
execution so that a writ of certiorari could be filed with the United
States Supreme Court.4 ' The stay was granted, but the attorney
refused to perfect the appeal. 4' The attorney wrote the North Carolina
Supreme Court, stating that he was not "an eleemosynary institution"
and that some judicial official in the state needed to promise him
compensation on a reasonable basis in order for him to continue with
the case because he could not "justify working for nothing or at a rate
less than that received by a garage mechanic." 49 The court, however,
had no problem justifying the attorney's obligation to continue
providing legal services in the case or the court's inherent authority to
discipline attorneys for unprofessional conduct. 50 The court suspended Mr. Hunoval from the practice of law for a year."
The United States Supreme Court has tentatively suggested that
federal courts also might possess inherent authority to compel lawyers
to serve; and that attorneys might be under a strong ethical obligation
to render assistance as well. 2 Arguably, the officer of the court and
lawyers. See Silverman, supra note 19, at 1015-16. Some observers have even
suggested that lawyers are partially responsible for widening the gap between the rich
and the poor. See Macaluso, supra note 20, at 67. Moreover, not only are individual
rights litigated in a given case under an adversarial system, but each case may also set
precedents which transcend the case at bar. Such is not the case in many other countries
where the ability to challenge governmental action is more limited. In re Amendments
to Rules Regulating the Fla. Bar and Rules of JudicialAdmin., 598 So. 2d at 42-43.
43. In re Amendments to Rules Regulating the Fla. Bar and Rules of Judicial Admin.,
573 So. 2d 800, 804-05 (Fla. 1990).
44. See Heslin v. Connecticut Law Clinic of Trantolo & Trantolo, 461 A.2d 938,
943-44 (Conn. 1983).
45. 247 S.E.2d 230 (N.C. 1977).
46. Id. at 231.
47. ld.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 232-33.
51. Id. at 233.
52. Mallard, 490 U.S. at 305 n.4. Such an inherent authority to appoint counsel
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related implied consent rationales, coupled with the legal monopoly
theory and the recognition of an ethical obligation, afford courts with
more than enough inherent authority to compel uncompensated
appointment.53
D. Ethical Justificationsfor Pro Bono Obligations
Indeed, the final argument in support of compuls6ry pro bono rests
upon the ethical duty owed by attorneys to perform public service.
The Model Rules of Professional Conduct (the "Model Rules")
provide that "[a] lawyer should aspire to render at least (50) hours of
pro bono publico legal services per year" and that "[a] lawyer shall not
seek to avoid appointment by a tribunal to represent a person except
for good cause ...
The predecessor to the Model Rules, the
Model Code of Professional Responsibility (the "Model Code"), also
recognized that lawyers owe a duty to provide legal services to those
who cannot afford to pay.55 Thus, quite apart from other legal
foundations, lawyers owe a modem ethical obligation to provide pro
bono services.56 Nevertheless, the ethical duty embraced by both the

might extend to civil cases as well. See, e.g., Bradshaw v. United States Dist. Ct., 742
F.2d 515, 518 (9th Cir. 1984) (coercive appointments may be proper for some civil
rights cases); Tyler v. Lark, 472 F.2d 1077, 1079-80 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S.
864 (1973) (denial of fees to attorney representing indigent prisoner in civil rights
case).
53. See Matalon, supra note 22, at 557-74.
54. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rules 6.1 and 6.2 (1992); see generally
Lisa G. Lerman, Public Service by Public Servants, 19 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1141, 1150-52
(1991).
55. The Model Code provides that:
Historically, the need for legal services of those unable to pay reasonable
fees has been met in part by lawyers who donated their services or accepted
court appointments on behalf of.such individuals. The basic responsibility
for providing legal services for those unable to pay ultimately rests upon the
individual lawyer, and personal involvement in the problems of the
disadvantaged can be one of the most rewarding experiences in the life of a
lawyer. Every lawyer, regardless of professional prominence or professional
workload, should find time to participate in serving the disadvantaged. The
rendition of free legal services to those unable to pay reasonable fees
continues to be an obligation of each lawyer . . . . Every lawyer should
support all proper efforts to meet this need for legal services.
MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY AND CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT EC 2-25
(1986). Many states have adopted the Model Rules, although a minority still adhere to
some version of the Model Code. Lerman, supra note 54, at 1151 n.37.
56. See Macaluso, supra note 20, at 86. In Mallard the Supreme Court observed that
"in a time when the need for legal services among the poor is growing and public
funding for such services has not kept pace, lawyers' ethical obligation to volunteer
their time and skills pro bono publico is manifest." Mallard, 490 U.S. at 310.
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Model Rules and the Model Code is aspirational in nature.57 Neither
authority mandates pro bono, nor provides disciplinary sanctions for
failure to perform pro bono work.
E. Need
The primary justification for requiring pro bono of practitioners,
overshadowing the historical, constitutional, practical, and ethical
justifications discussed above, is quite simply need. 58 In the mid1970s, Congress passed the Legal Services Corporation Act 59 which
established a central corporation to disburse federal funds for the legal
needs of the poor to community-based centers.6° Unfortunately, in the
1980s the Reagan administration drastically cut funding to the
corporation, 61 causing a trickle-down effect upon the community delivery systems.62 As a result of the Reagan administration's cutbacks, it
is now estimated that only fifteen to twenty percent of the civil legal
needs of the poor are being met, 63 even though their legal problems
57. Cramton, supra note 35, at 1123. As one justice noted, "[e]ven though it is not
an admirable course of conduct, if lawyers want to use their talents in a selfish and
miserly manner, I believe they have that right." In re Amendments to Rules Regulating
the Fla. Bar and Rules of Judicial Admin., 598 So. 2d at 54 (McDonald, J., concurring).
The Canadian Bar Association Professional Conduct Handbook is even less explicit in
requiring pro bono, possibly because the need for legal assistance is not as great as in
the United States given the legal aid programs funded by the Canadian government.
Macaluso, supra note 20, at 68.
58. See Schimenti, supra note 27, at 672-74. The significant increase in federal
habeas corpus petitions in capital cases has adversely affected the availability of
attorneys for other cases. See generally Debra C. Moss, Death, Habeas, and Good
Lawyers: Balancing Fairness and Finality, A.B.A. J., Dec. 1992, at 83; Vincent W.
Perini, Stirring the Death Row Pot, 56 TEX. B.J. 332 (1993); A Study of Representation
in Capital Cases in Texas, 56 TEX. B.J. 333 (1993).
59. Pub. L. No. 93-355, 88 Stat. 388 (1974) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §
2996 (1988)).
60. Silverman, supra note 19, at 983.
61. Funding for the corporation was reduced by 40% per capita from 1981 to 1989.
Lerman, supra note 54, at 1144. This cut occurred at a time when the right to counsel for
criminal defendants grew, along with government regulation and the numbers of
unrepresented people in society. In re Amendments to Rules Regulating the Fla. Bar and
Rules of JudicialAdmin., 598 So. 2d at 43.
62. Half the legal services offices in Washington State were closed in response to
funding cuts. Jack R. Dean, The Law Fund Challenge, WASH. ST. B. NEWS, Nov. 1991, at
27, 28-29.
63. See In re Amendments to Rules Regulating the Fla. Bar and Rules of Judicial
Admin., 598 So. 2d 41 (containing a report of the Florida Bar Foundation Joint
Commission on the delivery of legal services to the indigent in Florida); John Katzman,
The Dream, The Reality, The Future: TYLA Symposium Addresses Legal Services to the
Poor, 55 TEX. B.J. 621, 621 (1992); George J. Zweibel, Access to Justice in
Washington Revisited, WASH. ST. B. NEWS, Nov. 1990, at 7; see also Marrero Report,
supra note 41, at 768 (explaining that the unmet need for civil legal services for the
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often involve questions concerning access to the necessities of life.6 4
The bar has responded to this problem by establishing Interest on
Lawyer's Trust Account (IOLTA) programs in which the interest paid
is used to help fund legal services programs, 6 and by intensifying
voluntary pro bono efforts. 66 Although such efforts are certainly commendable, they are currently insufficient to meet the increasing need
for legal representation.67
In sum, a duty may be owed by the legal profession based upon
historical, constitutional, practical, ethical, and need-based justifications. Nevertheless, the exact parameters of that duty, as well as the
absoluteness of a court's ability to compel the performance of the duty,
may be weaker in cases not implicating Sixth Amendment rights.68
poor in New York is a critical problem). But see Scully, supra note 37, at 1238-39
(claiming that the Marrero Report was based on unsubstantiated assumptions about the
poor). To qualify for subsidized civil legal services under federal law a family of four can
receive no more than $16,750 annually. Ada Shen-Jaffee, The Legal-service Programs
of Washington State, WASH. ST. B. NEWS, Nov. 1991, at 46.
64. George J. Zweibel, Debunking the Myths About Access to Justice in Washington,
WASH. ST. B. NEWS, Nov. 1991, at 13. While public assistance benefits may not be
terminated without due process, due process has not been defined as a right to a hearing
and representation by counsel at that hearing. Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 270
(1970).
65. Schimenti, supra note 27, at 692. However, this funding source alone probably
is insufficient to meet the increased need for services. In re Amendments to Rules
Regulating the Fla. Bar and Rules of Judicial Admin., 598 So. 2d at 45. Some states also
divert filing fees to such programs. Zweibel, supra note 63, at 9.
66. For an excellent summary of the history of the bar's voluntary efforts in response
to federal funding and cuts in such funding see Esther Lardent, The Uncertain Future of
Attorney Volunteerism: Pro Bono, 56 TEX. B.J. 166, 166-67 (1993).
67. It is estimated that only 15% to 30% of all licensed attorneys participate in pro
bono activities. In re Amendments to Rules Regulating the Fla. Bar and Rules of Judicial
Admin., 598 So. 2d at 49; Graham, supra note 29, at 63; Marrero Report, supra note 41,
at 777. Moreover, while the gross number of volunteers may be growing, in reality the
net number of volunteers who actually handle cases may be shrinking because so many
volunteers later become inactive. Margaret O'Donnell, The National PerspectiveDevelopments On the Pro Bono Program Front, WASH. ST. B. NEWS, Nov. 1991, at 50,
50-51.
68. See supra notes 28-37 and accompanying text. Of course, some states have
statutory schemes for appointing and compensating attorneys who represent indigent
criminal defendants. See, e.g., 55 ILL. COMP. STAT. ch. 55, § 5/3-4006 to 4007 (West
1992); N.Y. COUNTY LAW § 722-b (McKinney 1991). Additionally, Congress has
authorized federal district courts to authorize appointment of counsel for indigent
persons to whom the Sixth Amendment right attaches. This statute, the Criminal Justice
Act, also provides for remuneration of counsel upon petition to the court. 18 U.S.C.
§ 3006A (1988).
Nevertheless, the attorney fees allowed may be less than
magnanimous.
In In re Snyder, 734 F.2d 334 (8th Cir. 1984), rev'd, 472 U.S. 634 (1985), an attorney
complained about the "extreme gymnastics" which were required to receive "puny
amounts" under the Criminal Justice Act, and stated that he was "extremely disgusted" by
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The cry for mandatory pro bono programs encompassing both criminal
and civil cases is becoming resoundingly loud.6 Thus, the question
becomes whether the bar should require attorneys to work a certain
number of pro bono hours annually in order to meet the legal needs of
indigent litigants in these cases.
III. OPPOSITION TO MANDATORY PRO BONO

The response by many members of the bar to the question of
whether pro bono should be required is: "Why should lawyers in
particular be expected to donate their professional services?" These
critics argue that even though lawyers are granted a privilege to
practice by the State, this does not imply a requirement to assume pro
bono obligations, because other practitioners also licensed by the State
are not required to donate their services.70 Furthermore, they assert
that it is not as if lawyers hold the keys to the courthouse doors; just as
property owners can secure construction permits and build without
contractors, litigants can proceed pro se. 7 Finally, opponents of mandatory pro bono express concerns about whether pro bono services
infringe upon the duties owed by lawyers to their other clients, and on
a more personal level, their own families.72
the treatment afforded him, that he no longer wished to be considered for court
appointments, and that he had "simply had it." Id. at 336. Unimpressed with his
protest, the Eighth Circuit ruled that a six month suspension from the practice of law
would be appropriate, unless the attorney provided the court with a sincere letter of
apology for his disrespectful remarks. Id. at 344. The Supreme Court reversed, finding
that the attorney's conduct did not warrant suspension from practice. In re Snyder, 472
U.S. at 645-47. The Court, however, did not rule on whether or not suspension would be
proper for the attorney's refusal to serve in Criminal Justice Act cases because of his
objections to the allegedly biased administration of the statute.
69. See generally Marrero Report, supra note 41.
70. See supra notes 17-24 and accompanying text (discussing the officer of the court
and implied consent justifications for requiring pro bono); see also Colbert v. Rickmon,
747 F. Supp. 518, 527 (W.D. Ark. 1990) (memorandum opinion) ("This court agrees
with those courts which have held that attorneys do not 'impliedly consent' to their
being forced to represent civil rights litigants without pay, just as hairdressers, also
licensed by the state, do not impliedly consent to perform free haircuts for the needy.").
71. See supra notes 38-39 and accompanying text (discussing the legal monopoly
theory). The bench has special obligations with respect to pro se litigants. See Caruth
v. Pinkney, 683 F.2d 1044, 1050 (7th Cir. 1982). Other licensed entities, such as
utilities, enjoy state sanctioned monopoly power without a commensurate obligation to
provide free service to the poor. See Paul E. McGreal, Are We To Be A Profession?, 56
TEX. B.J. 38, 38-39 (1993) (urging that pro bono service be required because of a
professional obligation).
72. John MacArthur Maguire, Poverty and Civil Litigation, 36 HARV. L. REV. 361,
392 (1923). See Webb v. Baird, 6 Ind. 13, 17 (1854) ("To the attorney, his profession
is his means of livelihood. His legal knowledge is his capital stock. His professional
services are no more at the mercy of the public, as to remuneration, than are the goods of
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Opponents of mandatory pro bono also raise constitutional concerns
about such proposals.73 For example, opponents argue that even if
there are good reasons why attorneys should volunteer their services,
state action compelling such service may violate the Equal Protection
Clause of the United States Constitution.74 Singling out attorneys
may, however, bear a rational relationship to a legitimate governmental
interest.75 Critics of mandatory pro bono also assert that requiring an
unconsenting lawyer to serve may violate the Thirteenth Amendment's
prohibition against involuntary servitude. 6 Most courts would reject
such a proposition, 77 although the fact that some attorneys would raise
that issue may call into question the wisdom of coercive
appointments. 71 Critics of mandatory pro bono also argue that uncompensated, compelled service could constitute a taking of property
without just compensation or due process in violation of the Fifth and
the merchant, or the crops of the farmer, or the wares of the mechanic."). Financial
pressures fuel many attorneys' objections to mandatory pro bono. See also Macaluso,
supra note 20, at 72.
73. See generally Schimenti, supra note 27, at 680-89; Zelin, supra note 29, at 1065.
The committee which was appointed to study mandatory pro bono in New York State
concluded for various reasons that their final proposal was constitutionally sound.
Marrero Report, supra note 41, at 857-61.
74. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. See generally Scully, supra note 37, at 1258-60.
75. The appropriate level of review with respect to the interpretation of the Equal
Protection Clause is the rational basis test, whereby classifications are constitutionally
permissible if they are reasonably related to a legitimate governmental objective. See,
e.g., Pennell v. City of San Jose, 485 U.S. 1 (1988) (ordinance establishing rent
controls); Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456 (1981) (statute
regulating retail sale of milk containers); Newman Signs, Inc. v. Hjelle, 268 N.W.2d
741 (N.D. 1978) (federal statute regulating highway billboards).
Classifications based upon race, religion, national origin, and arguably gender, are
suspect, as are classifications which infringe upon fundamental rights guaranteed by the
Constitution. These classifications are subject to strict scrutiny review and must be
necessary to prcnote a compelling state interest. See, e.g., Shapiro v. Thompson, 394
U.S. 618 (1969) (right to travel); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (right
to privacy); McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184 (1964) (anti-miscegenation law).
76. U.S. CONST. amend. XIII.
77. In re Amendments to Rules Regulating the Fla. Bar and Rules of Judicial Admin.,
573 So. 2d 800 (Fla. 1990). The Florida Supreme Court concluded that the Thirteenth
Amendment's prohibition against involuntary servitude required threat of legal
confinement or physical restraint. Id. at 805; see also Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258,
265-66 (1972) (amendment not applicable when individual can choose freedom even if
that choice results in substantial economic loss); Butler v. Perry, 240 U.S. 328, 333
(1916) (Thirteenth Amendment not intended to interfere with enforcement of duties owed
by individuals to the state such as military service or jury duty).
78. Bradshaw v. United States Dist. Ct., 742 F.2d 515, 517 (9th Cir. 1984) ("When
the degree of resistance is so high that attorneys would rather confront the court with
questionable Thirteenth Amendment arguments than provide counsel for an indigent, the
helpfulness of coercive appointment is subject to question.").
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Fourteenth Amendments. 79 While most courts again would probably
answer in the negative,80 that issue is more debatable particularly with
respect to compelled appointment in civil cases.8' Opponents further
argue that mandatory pro bono programs could violate the First
Amendment guarantees of freedom of speech and the right of
association. Although such rights are recognized with respect to the
practice of law, mandatory pro bono probably would not constitute a
violation so long as the system of appointment was sufficiently
flexible. Finally, critics assert that if an attorney was compelled to
represent an indigent client with respect to a criminal matter with which
the attorney had no experience, such an action could violate the client's
Sixth Amendment right to have the effective assistance of counsel.84
That attorneys who are required to serve are not immune from malpractice suits85 should lessen the likelihood of this possibility
occurring; yet, it is precisely that lack of immunization which causes
many attorneys to fear mandatory pro bono proposals.'
Aside from these constitutional concerns, there are practical objections to mandatory pro bono proposals. Opponents of these proposals
note that poverty law is a specialized field in which the average
attorney may not possess sufficient expertise; therefore, the quality of
79. The practice of law is a privilege which is subject to constitutional protection.
Barnard v. Thorstenn, 489 U.S. 546, 553 (1989); see also Coleman, supra note 24, at
584-85.
80. See, e.g., United States v. Dillon, 346 F.2d 633, 638 (9th Cir. 1965), cert.
denied, 382 U.S. 978 (1966); In re Amendments to Rules Regulating the Fla. Bar and
Rules of Judicial Admin., 573 So. 2d at 805; see also Warner v. Commonwealth, 400
S.W.2d 209, 211-12 (Ky. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 858 (1966) (appointment of
counsel for indigent criminal defendant).
8 1. Such appointments may violate state constitutions.
Moreover, if an
uncompensated appointment would have a significant impact on the individual
attorney's income, an argument could be made for a violation of the Fifth Amendment.
Scully, supra note 37, at 1255-57. Also, compelling an attorney to pay expenses
without reimbursement could be unconstitutional. Williamson v. Vardeman, 674 F.2d
1211, 1215-16 (8th Cir. 1982).
82. See Keller v. State Bar of Cal., 496 U.S. 1 (1990) (where the court found that
compulsory bar dues cannot be used to advance political or ideological causes); In re
Primus, 436 U.S. 412 (1978) (offer by lawyer of representation for furtherance of
ideological and political causes was protected activity).
83. Cash contributions in lieu of service is one option. See generally Scully, supra
note 37, at 1249.
84. This concern led the attorney in Mallard to seek a court order dismissing his
appointment. See supra note 34.
85. Ferri v. Ackerman, 444 U.S. 193, 205 (1979); McLaughlin v. Royster, 346 F.
Supp. 297, 301 (E.D. Va. 1972).
86. Bradshaw v. United States Dist. Ct., 742 F.2d 515, 516 (9th Cir. 1984). That fear
is particularly sensible today given the cost of malpractice insurance. See infra notes
89-94 and accompanying text (discussing other practical considerations).
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the legal services rendered under a mandatory system may be less than
effective. 7 Critics further assert that it is questionable whether or not
the implementation of a system of compulsory service is an economically efficient allocation of resources.'
Some critics propose that a better solution might be to require
donations of money to fund legal aid projects staffed by specialists,
rather than to require donations of time. 9 Of course both suggestions
presuppose that an indigent individual would prefer to have a lawyer
for an hour instead of one hundred dollars in cash, an assumption
which again implicates resource allocation issues. 9° Other opponents
of mandatory pro bono suggest that instead of merely increasing the
indigent population's access to attorneys, perhaps efforts should
concentrate on increasing their access to justice. Reforms which
streamline matrimonial and housing courts, thus allowing indigents to
appear pro se effectively, 9' which provide more options for alternative
dispute resolution, and which allow paralegals to assume a more active
role in the provision of legal services, 92 might be a more effective
means for achieving the goal of equal access to justice. 93 Some observers also argue that it is the collective responsibility of society, not the

87. Even the Supreme Court has recognized the reality of specialized practices and
observed that a court's appointment of counsel for criminal defendants should be
cognizant of that fact. Barnard v. Thorstenn, 489 U.S. 546, 558 (1989). Nevertheless,
attorneys in most cases are able to rise to the occasion when circumstances so demand.
See Lawrence T. Welch, Patent Law and Pro Bono Practice-Activities for the Benefit of
the Public, 70 MIcH. B.J. 914 (1991). Additionally, many of the present voluntary
programs have some sort of mentor system. See Allen, supra note 12, at 21.
88. Sol Wachtler, Introduction to Synposium on Mandatory Pro Bono, 19 HOFSTRA
L. REV. 739, 740-41 (1991). It also can be argued that mandatory pro bono proposals
will have a more severe adverse economic effect on small firms, as opposed to large
firms, and that such programs will result in a transfer of wealth from the smaller firms to
the larger firms. Macey, supra note 39, at 1119-20. Many attorneys in smaller firms,
sole practitioners, and minority attorneys already subsidize pro bono activities with
reduced fee arrangements. Elefant, supra note 31, at 121 n.128. Moreover, for these
practitioners, in particular, billable hours never equal collectible hours. Id.
89. See Elefant, supra note 31, at 109-17.
90. See Macey, supra note 39, at 1117-23; Scully, supra note 37, at 1234-35.
Furthermore, society might suffer as a result of the private subsidization of litigation
which might encourage unmeritorious suits. Statutory fee shifting arrangements might
be more efficient and provide more effective representation. See Cramton, supra note
35, at 1138.
91. Scully, supra note 37, at 1236-37.
92. Currently, however, lawyers are under an ethical obligation to assist in
preventing the unauthorized practice of law. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL
RESPONSIBILITY EC 3-I (1983).
93. See supra notes 40-42 and accompanying text (discussing the problem of the
complexity of the legal system).
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bar, to both implement and fund full legal services for the indigent. 94
In the absence of a collective effort to improve conditions for the poor,
however, some help by lawyers is probably better than no help by
anyone.
IV. PRO BONO TODAY

Currently n6 federal or state bar association mandates pro bono as a
condition of membership.95 The A.B.A. recently adopted a model rule
which urges lawyers to perform fifty or more hours of pro bono work
a year, and to devote a substantial majority of that time to the legal
needs of the poor. 96 Many state bar associations also have set such
94. Colbert v. Rickman, 747 F. Supp. 518, 527 (W.D. Ark.) (memorandum opinion).
See also Schimenti, supra note 27, at 690-91. While the committee which was
appointed to study proposals for mandatory pro bono in New York recognized that
governmental financial support of civil legal services for the poor was necessary, it
acknowledged that such support would probably not be forthcoming, and therefore, the
initiative rested in the hands of the bar. Marrerro Report, supra note 41, at 781-82. For
a discussion of the reduction in federal funding under the Legal Services Corporation Act,
see supra notes 59-64 and accompanying text. For a brief discussion of legal assistance
in other countries see Macaluso, supra note 20, at 80-81.
95. Although a committee appointed by the Chief Judge of the State of New York to
study the availability of legal services recommended an actual mandatory minimum of 40
hours of qualifying pro bono legal services every two years, the implementation of that
plan has been put on hold. Wachtler, supra note 88, at 742-43. Initially Chief Judge
Wachtler suspended implementation of the plan for two years in order to give the bar's
proposal for a voluntary system a chance to succeed; that deadline passed in the spring
of 1992. Id.
In contrast to the federal and state bar associations, many local bar associations, in
which membership is voluntary, do require a certain amount of pro bono service. See
generally Scully, supra note 37, at 1263-65. Such a requirement is legally permissible.
Scott v. Roper, 688 S.W.2d 757, 769 (Mo. 1985) (en banc). The quality and
effectiveness of these local programs, however, has been questioned. Lardent, supra
note 66, at 167-68.
In addition, mandatory pro bono programs have been instituted in several law schools,
including Seton Hall University, Tulane University, the University of Pennsylvania,
Valparaiso University, Florida State University, the University of Hawaii, the
University of Louisville, the University of Richmond, Stetson University, and the
Touro College of Law. Schimenti, supra note 27, at 695.
96. The Model Rule provides:
[A] lawyer should aspire to render at least (50) hours of pro bono publico legal
services per year. In fulfilling this responsibility, the lawyer should:
(a) provide a substantial majority of the (50) hours of legal services without
fee or expectation of fee to:
(1) persons of limited means; or
(2) charitable, religious, civic, community, governmental and educational
organizations in matters which are designed primarily to address the needs of
persons of limited means; and
(b) provide any additional services through:
(1) delivery of legal services at no fee or substantially reduced fee to
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aspirational goals. For example, Michigan adopted a voluntary
standard of thirty hours or $300 in contributions to non-profit
programs which deliver civil legal services to the poor.97 The Board
of Governors of the Washington State Bar passed a resolution which
also suggested an annual thirty hour commitment to servicing the
unmet civil legal needs of low income people.98 Some state bar
associations encourage attorneys to meet the voluntary quota by offering vouchers for free or reduced admission to continuing legal
education seminars. 99 For instance, the State Bar of Texas Board of
Directors established a goal of fifty hours and adopted a voluntary
reporting requirement.'0° Additionally, the Texas Board established a
Pro Bono College to recognize attorneys who perform seventy-five
hours or more of eligible pro bono service a year.'0 ' Thus far, Florida
is the only state to adopt a mandatory reporting requirement for the
individuals, groups or organizations seeking to secure or protect civil rights,
civil liberties or public rights, or charitable, religious, civic, community,
governmental and educational organizations in matters in furtherance of their
organizational purposes, where the payment of standard legal fees would
significantly deplete the organization's economic resources or would be
otherwise inappropriate;
(2) delivery of legal services at a substantially reduced fee to persons of
limited means; or
(3) participation in activities for improving the law, the legal system or the
legal profession.
In addition, a lawyer should voluntarily contribute financial support to
organizations that provide legal services of limited means.
MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 6.1 (1993). See also Mark Hanson,
Reporting Pro Bono, A.B.A. J., Oct. 1993, at 16.
97. Voluntary Standard for Pro Bono Participation By All Members of the State Bar of
Michigan, 70 MICH. B.J. 930 (1991). The standard also allows attorneys to choose
whether to combine service and monetary donations in order to meet the goal, or to
provide representation without charge to low income individuals. Id. See generally Paul
R. Abrahamsen, Pro Bono Involvement, 70 MICH. B.J. 896 (1991).
98. Zweibel, supra note 63, at 10.
99. Oregon awards attorneys who donate 40 or more hours one free seminar or a CLE
publication. Pro Bono Snapshots, 55 TEX. B.J. 619 (1992). Washington awards a set
number of vouchers to recipients who are selected at the local level. Stewart A. Estes &
Maria Elliott, Learn Something Through Pro Bono, WASH. ST. B. NEWS, Nov. 1991, at
42.
Arizona, Colorado, Kansas, Maine, Minnesota, Nebraska, South Carolina,
Wisconsin, as well as some local bar associations, have similar incentive programs. Id.
at 42-43.
100. State Bar of Texas Pro Bono Policy, 55 TEX. B.J. 864 (1992). While attorneys
are strongly encouraged to satisfy the requirement and report their qualifying hours,
there is no disciplinary sanction for failing to comply with either requirement. Id. at
865.
101. Giving Credit Where Credit is Due: Pro Bono College Created, 55 TEX. B.J. 620
(1992). Attorneys receive a certificate to commemorate their service, and after five or
more years of membership in the College, a plaque is awarded. Id.
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state's aspirational goal of twenty hours of service or a cash contribution of $350 yearly. 10 2 Under the Florida bar's program, nonresident attorneys are not exempt, while government attorneys who are
prohibited from doing pro bono work are exempt.'0 3
V. PRO BONO IN LARGE FIRMS
In addition to the emphasis placed on pro bono service by state and
local bar associations, and the ethical obligation of lawyers to perform
pro bono service, there are practical reasons that suggest large firms
should support pro bono service. 10 4 Pro bono service is a way for
firms to attract recent law school graduates' 0 5 and for newly-licensed
attorneys to gain experience in litigation."° Pro bono work also can
lead to potential business contacts and beneficial relationships with
other members of the bar and the bench,0 7 while promoting a positive
public image. 0 8
These factors, coupled with the public service obligation inherent in
the profession of law,' 0 9 should serve as ample incentive to motivate
large law firms to perform pro bono service. In fact, large firms do
seem to be cognizant of their social responsibility, as evidenced by the
102. While attorneys must report their hours or monetary contributions, there are no
disciplinary sanctions for failing to perform pro bono services or for failing to
contribute. For the complete report on Florida's new policy see In Re Amendments to
Rules Regulating the Fla. Bar and Rules of Judicial Admin., 598 So. 2d 41, 45-54 (Fla.
1992). , Ohio and Tennessee are considering similar plans. Hanson, supra note 96, at
16.
103. Historically, governmental attorneys have been barred from participating in
pro bono projects because of potential conflicts of interest and prohibitions against the
use of government resources for private practice, although that taboo is becoming less
prevalent. See Lerman, supra note 54; see also Stewart A. Estes, The Government
Lawyer and Pro Bono, WASH. ST. B. NEWS, Nov. 1990, at 19; John Katzman,
Government Attorneys and Pro Bono-Overcoming the Obstacles, 55 TEX. B.J. 862
(1992).
104. See Elefant, supra note 31, at 104-08. Arguably, such secondary goals are
ethically suspect. In other words, if professional ethics give rise to a duty to serve, then
the fulfillment of that calling should be sufficient and should provide full satisfaction.
105. Lardent, supra note 66, at 172.
106. Making It Happen, 55 TEX. B.J. 618, 619 (1992). One attorney related that he
had experienced the thrill of arguing before the United States Supreme Court, an
opportunity which probably otherwise would not have been available to him. Welch,
supra note 87, at 920.
107. Macaluso, supra note 20, at 69.
108. Pro bono service performed by corporate counsel also can serve to enhance the
corporation's public image. Nina Harlan, Corporate Counsel and Pro Bono: How and
Why to Get Involved, WASH. ST. B. NEWS, Nov. 1990, at 21. See generally Steve
Bolerjack & Tom Saybolt, Corporate Pro Bono Programs-Making a Difference, 70
MICH. B.J. 900 (1991).
109. See supra part !I.
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fact that some firms give billable hour credit for the pro bono efforts of
their associates." 0 There is also evidence that large firms have contributed substantially to public interest litigation that has benefited the
disadvantaged economically,"' and that large firms have initiated and
participated in low profile programs which have had a significant
impact on the poor." Nevertheless, large firms have often been criticized for targeting their pro bono efforts at high profile charities and
high impact cause-oriented cases which bear no direct correlation to
improving the plight of the impoverished." 3
A. Pro Bono in Large Firms: An EmpiricalAnalysis
In an attempt to examine the potential ramifications of mandatory
pro bono, a study" 4 was undertaken to analyze the relationship
between pro bono work and three variables: firm performance, organizational structure, and minority membership." 5

1 10. Carole L. Hollon, What Washington Law Firms are Doing, WASH. ST. B. NEWS,
Nov. 1990, at 23, 23-24; see also Thomas C. Clinton, Law Firms and Pro Bono, 70
MICH. B.J. 904 (1991). For an example of a firm policy, see Model Law Firm Pro Bono
Policy, 70 MICH. B.J. 931 (1991).
111. For example, one program, the Litigation Assistance Partnership Project,
sponsored by the A.B.A., matches large law firms with legal services programs so that
they may provide needed assistance in high impact cases dealing with such issues as
Medicaid coverage of obstetrical services and the employment rights of migrant
workers. Ann Barker, LAPP: An Innovative National Approach to Pro Bono, 70 MICH.
B.J. 928, 928-29 (1991).
112. For an impressive and refreshing article on one large firm's experience with
establishing a satellite office to assist the needy in Richmond, Virginia, see George H.
Hettrick, Doing Good: How One Law Firm Started a Low-Fee Branch Office to Help
Those in Need, A.B.A. J., Dec. 1992, at 77.
1 13. Elefant, supra note 31, at 117; Scully, supra note 37, at 1267.
1 14. Large firms were selected for this Study for three reasons. First, the relevant
data was readily available for the one hundred largest law firms in the country. This
availability is significant because law firms are not publicly held entities. Thus, their
financial performance information is not in the public domain and is generally
inaccessible. Second, only large firms have the critical mass necessary to examine the
relationship between women, minorities, and pro bono work because there must be
sufficient numbers of women and minorities to make statistically valid inferences.
Third, large law firms are more likely to have the resources available to perform certain
pro bono services, such as defending death penalty cases and litigating large-scale class
action suits where the amount recoverable per individual is de minimis: It is valuable to
examine the relationship between performing such service and certain variables which
characterize the firm.
115. The research design was constrained due to scarcity of available data. The
variables that were explored provide an insightful look into firm performance, firm
structure, minority membership, and the relationship of these variables to pro bono.
While the Study does not evaluate the pro bono efforts of large firms qualitatively, it
does quantify their efforts in comparison to specific variables.
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Supporting data for the Study was derived from two sources: The
American Lawyer and the annual directories published by the National
Association of Law Placement, Incorporated ("NALP")." 6 Since
1984, The American Lawyer has published a yearly synopsis of
performance data for the highest revenue-producing law firms in the
United States." 7 In addition, the 1992 survey by The American
Lawyer used in this analysis included both traditional firm performance data, as well as pro bono performance data.'8 The second
source, the yearly directories of NALP, provided the demographic information used in this study." 9
116. The American Lawyer is a bi-monthly publication of American Lawyer Media,
L.P., which publishes articles of general interest to attorneys. Since 1984, the
American Lawyer has published a profitability survey of the largest law firms in
America. NALP is a voluntary association of law schools, law firms, and private and
governmental agencies which establishes and maintains standards for law firm
placement and hiring. DIRECTORY OF LEGAL EMPLOYERS 1-3 (National Association for
Law Placement ed., 1993).
117. See, e.g., Steven Brill, America's One Hundred Highest-Grossing Firms, AM.
LAW., July-Aug. 1989, at 8 [hereinafter One Hundred Highest-Grossing Firms 1989];
Steven Brill, America's One Hundred Highest-Grossing Firms, AM. LAW., July-Aug.
1993, at 50A [hereinafter One Hundred Highest-Grossing Firms 1993]. These firms are
generally large in number of attorneys as well. Id. The study did not always encompass
the top one hundred firms. See, e.g., Steven Brill, America's Fifty Highest-Grossing
Firms, AM. LAW., July-Aug. 1985, at 89 [hereinafter Fifty Highest-Grossing Firms
1985].
The American Lawyer obtains its data through personal and telephone interviews with
managing partners, other partners, and various inside sources. One Hundred HighestGrossing Firms 1989, supra, at 7. The publication then uses several methods of crossvalidation to confirm accuracy. For example, contacts routinely are made with current
and former clients, former partners and associates, and other sources to verify the
information. Id. at 7-9. Such a triangular approach helps to confirm key performance
and size information for each law firm in the data base.
Finally, prior to publication, The American Lawyer asks managing partners at each
firm surveyed to confirm or correct the tabulated performance and size data. Steven Brill,
America's One Hundred Highest-Grossing Firms, AM. LAW., July-Aug. 1992, at 16
[hereinafter One Hundred Highest-Grossing Firms 1992]. While the methodology
employed virtually assures a high degree of accuracy, nevertheless the research is not
comparable to a public audit in the sense that law firms are not mandated by statute to
report their profitability. These firms voluntarily report their profitability to The
American Lawyer. Inaccurate reporting, however, does not subject them to civil or
criminal liability. Nevertheless, the voluntariness of the study does not necessarily
undermine its accuracy because the study is conducted on an annual basis. Therefore,
firms can review the results in a timely manner and correct any erroneous information
before the next study. One Hundred Highest-Grossing Firms 1992, supra, at 7. Such
continuity thus tends to increase the accuracy of the results.
H 8. One Hundred Highest-Grossing Firms 1992, supra note 117, at 16. The
American Lawyer defined pro bono work as time spent by lawyers, not paralegals or
support staff, performing legal services. Id.
119. DIRECTORY OF LEGAL EMPLOYERS (National Association for Law Placement ed.,
1992). Each year NALP solicits and then publishes information about law firms that
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The American Lawyer's study used a weighted average of two
factors to grade each firm: (1) the firm's average number of pro bono
hours per lawyer (two-thirds of the score); and (2) the percentage of
lawyers who did more than twenty hours of pro bono work annually
(one-third of the score). 20 The study assigned grades to each firm on
a curve from A to D based upon the weighted pro bono scores. Firms
survey, or
which failed to participate in The American Lawyer's
21
provided only partial information, received an F.'
The quantitative nature of the three criteria explored in our Study,
law firm performance, organizational structure, and minority membership, dictated a correlation analysis approach which measured the
extent to which these criteria were related to each other. 22 To facilitate
this quantitative analysis, our Study converted the pro bono scores
from letter grades to five point Likert-scaled 123 variable scores
whereby an A became equivalent to five points, a B to four, and so
might be of interest to graduating law school students seeking employment. Id. While
NALP's questionnaire contains no firm performance data, it does request information
such as staffing levels, primary practice areas, employment, and partnership data, as
well as demographic information, such as the race and sex of the attorneys. Id. The
information contained in the 1992 NALP directory was matched on a firm-by-firm basis
with the 1992 data in The American Lawyer. One Hundred Highest-Grossing Firms
1992, supra note 117, at 12.
120. A simple average is used when all variables are given equal importance. A
weighted average is an average in which one or more variables is given more importance
than other variables. See STEPHEN B. JARRELL, BASIC STATISTICS 88-91 (1994). The
proportional weighting was based upon the Model Code's directive which provides that
"[t]he basic responsibility for providing legal services . . . rests upon the individual
lawyer .. " MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 2-25 (1980).
121. Either failing to respond or providing only partial information about pro bono
participation resulted in an "F" pro bono grade because: (I) no firm complained about
receiving an "F' grade; (2) generally, firms that perform well in pro bono wish for that
information to be widely known; and (3) since pro bono activities are a strong recruiting
tool, the partial disclosure or total failure to disclose pro bono activities reflects a lack
of commitment by the firm to pro bono. Telephone Interview with JoAnne Laurence,
Special Report Editor, The American Lawyer (Nov. 5, 1992).
122. Two variables which change in a regular, predictable manner are said to be
correlated. Correlation analysis measures the strength of the association between the
two variables, but does not imply any cause and effect relationship. That is, changes in
one variable do not necessarily cause the other variable to change. JARRELL, supra note
120, at 490. For example, consider the relationship between telephone poles and crime.
Telephone poles and crime levels are positively correlated. However, an increase in
telephone poles does not cause an increase in crime. Rather, the increases in both are
probably caused by population increases. That is, as population increases, both the
number of telephone poles and the level of crime generally increase.
123. A Likert scale represents an odd number of possible values where one end of the
scale represents the low and the opposite end represents the high. The middle value
represents the mean. THOMAS S. BATEMAN & GERALD R. FERRIS, METHOD & ANALYSIS IN
ORGANIZATIONAL RESEARCH 241-52 (1984).
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forth. 24 The Study tested the correlation analysis at a significance
level of at least five percent. 25
1. Pro Bono and Large Firm Financial Performance 26
There is a strong indication that pro bono work is negatively related
to firm profitability. 27 Because pro bono service is by definition nonbillable, as firms increase the amount of pro bono work, presumably
various aspects of firm performance should decrease. In the Study,
revenue per lawyer, costs per lawyer, profits per partner, and profits
per lawyer were all negatively and significantly correlated with pro
bono efforts. 28 Gross revenues, total costs, and net profits were all
29
negatively, but not significantly, correlated with pro bono efforts.
In other words, higher pro bono performance is associated with low
124. The Statistical Analysis System (SAS), a statistical software package, was used
for the correlation analysis. This software allows users to analyze large amounts of data
to determine frequency distributions, to compute descriptive statistics, and to
accomplish various other sophisticated data manipulations. See generally SAS USER'S
GUIDE: BASICS (5th ed. 1985).
125. In the charts in the Appendix, infra pp. 91, 93, 97, "p" represents the level of
statistical significance. For example, a "p" of .05 means that there is only a five
percent probability that the statistical relationship is due to chance, rather than to a true
correlation between the two variables under consideration. A "p" of .01 represents an
even greater degree of significance. Consider the proposition that there is a
relationship between pro bono performance and profits per partner (PROF). In order to
test this proposition, or hypothesis, the null hypothesis is stated as: "[Tihere is no
relationship between pro bono performance and PROF." The purpose of the hypothesis
test is to determine whether or not a real relationship exists. If the null hypothesis can
be rejected, then it is expected that the proposition is true. As shown in Table 1B in the
Appendix, infra p. 91, the correlation between pro bono performance and PROF is -.23,
with a significance level of p < .01. This finding indicates that the probability of a
spurious relationship, that is, a relationship due to random chance only, is less than one
out of one hundred. Thus, the null hypothesis of no relationship may be rejected, and
the proposition presumed to be true. Smaller p-values indicate stronger support for the
proposition. In contrast, larger p-values indicate weaker support for the proposition.
For a discussion of statistical significance, see generally JARRELL, supra note 120, at
438-40.
126. Any measure of long-term performance must include indices of profitability as
well as the ability to attract and keep clients. However, the study herein focused on
traditional absolute and relative measures of performance. For example, total revenue is
a measure of absolute performance for a firm, while revenue per lawyer is a measure of
marginal performance, which allows for a comparison of law firms of varying sizes.
David Maister, Profitability: Beating the Downward Trend, AM. LAW., July-Aug. 1984,
at 6. Profits per partner, perhaps the best indicator of firm performance from a partner's
perspective, is analogous to earnings per share in corporate profitability studies.
Profitability per equity position is a common and important measure of performance for
both law firms and traditional manufacturing firms. id.
127. See infra app., tbl. lB.
128. See infra app., tbl. lB.
129. See infra app., tbl. lB.
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firm performance for every measure used in this study.130
This conclusion strengthens the objections to mandatory pro bono
service. 3' These findings also support the belief that donating services rather than money is not economically efficient. 32 Nevertheless,
since pro bono work by large firms may have a negative impact upon
performance, a decision to engage in such service, which is not legally
required, 33 arguably represents one of the highest levels of social
responsibility. 134
2. Pro Bono and Organizational Structure
Law firm size may be related to pro bono service because,
theoretically, as an organization grows it becomes more formalized and
differentiated, and less responsive to the concerns of its individual

130. See infra app., tbl. lB. Even though both total costs and costs per lawyer are
negatively correlated with pro bono performance, that is, a decrease in costs is
associated with an increase in pro bono scores, the expected association between lower
costs and higher profits does not necessarily exist for large law firms. Large law firms
are not cost-driven, but revenue-driven. Ward Bower, Strategies for Profitability, 13
LEGAL ECON. 44, 50 (Oct. 1987). The strong negative association between profits per
partner and pro bono performance demonstrates that lower costs were still not sufficient
to increase profits per partner. In other words, as pro bono scores increased, costs and
revenues decreased; however, revenues decreased faster than costs, which resulted in
lower profitability.
13 1. See supra notes 70-94 and accompanying text.
132. See supra notes 89-90 and accompanying text.
133. See supra note 95 and accompanying text.
134. One model for evaluating the social responsibility of organizations divides
such responsibility into four levels. The first level of social responsibility is economic
responsibility. The business organization is, above all, the basic economic unit of
society. Its responsibility is to produce the goods and services which society desires
and to maximize profits for its owners. The second level of social responsibility is
legal responsibility. This level defines what society considers important with respect
to appropriate organizational behavior, since organizations are expected to fulfill their
economic goals within a legal framework. The third level of social responsibility is
ethical responsibility and includes behaviors that are not necessarily codified, as well as
those which may not serve the organization's direct economic interests. The final level
of social responsibility for organizations is discretionary responsibility. This form of
responsibility is purely voluntary and is guided by an organization's desire to make
social contributions and not mandated by economics, law, or ethics. This level of
responsibility is the most difficult to achieve because it requires a proactive approach.
The organization must recognize a duty which exceeds societal expectations and become
an active participant in providing for the community's welfare. See generally Archie B.
Carroll, A Three-Dimensional Conceptual Model of Corporate Performance, 4 ACAD.
MGMT. REV. 497 (1979); David B. Fritz & Helmut Becker, Linking Management
Behavior to Ethical Philosophy-An Empirical Investigation, 7 ACAD. MGMT. J. 165
(1984); Eugene Szwajkowski, Organizational Illegality: Theoretical Integration and
Illustrative Application, 10 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 558 (1985) (discussing three underlying
factors-environment, structure, and choice processes-in business crime theory).
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members or the community it serves.' 35 The size of a law firm most
often is measured by the total number of lawyers in the firm including
both partners'3 6 and associates.'." While this absolute number is an
135. See generally Richard L. Daft & Patricia J. Bradshaw, The Process of Horizontal
Differentiation: Two Models, 25 ADMIN. SCi. Q. 441 (Sept. 1980) (examining process
through which new academic and administrative departments at a university are
established); Richard H. Hall & Charles R. Tittle, A Note on Bureaucracy and Its
"Correlates", 72 AM. J. Soc. 267 (Nov. 1966) (associating greater bureaucratization
with organization's concern for objects rather than ideas and finding less correlation
between degree of bureaucratization and size of organization); Stanley Lieberson &
James F. O'Connor, Leadership and OrganizationalPerformance: A Study of Large
Corporations, 37 AM. Soc. REV. 117 (Apr. 1972) (comparing impact of leadership
changes with yearly, industry, and company influences); Thomas A. Mahoney et al., The
Conditioning Influence of Organizational Size Upon Managerial Practice,8 ORG.
BEHAV. & HUM. PREF. 230 (1972) (analyzing relationship between organization size and
organizational behavior or managerial practice); Paul M. Nemeroff & David L. Ford, Jr.,
Task Effectiveness and Human Fulfillment in Organizations: A Review and
Development of a Conceptual Contingency Model, I ACAD. MGMT. 69 (Oct. 1976).
One reason for this tendency is the need to divide the increased workload of the
organization. Thus, increasing the number of members requires that an organization
become more formalized in order to maintain effectiveness. This formalization process,
which is characterized by an attempt to control organizational behavior in a strict
manner, seems to be an unavoidable consequence of growth. Studies of organizational
growth have associated differentiation, specialization, routinization, and
impersonalization, along with decreases in participation by top managers, to increases
in size. Daft, supra; Hall, supra; Lieberson, supra; Mahoney, supra; Nemeroff, supra.
136. A full or general partner is defined as one "who participates fully in the profits,
losses and management ... and who is personally liable for its debts." BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 1120 (6th ed. 1990). Partners are the owners of the firm and normally hold
equity positions in the firm. As such, they are responsible for the overall management
of the firm and direct the major functional divisions of the firm. They are also primarily
responsible for client relations, billings, and the generation of new business. Partners
divide the net profits of the firm after all expenses are paid, including salaries paid to
associates. Some firms have different classes of partners who share disproportionately
in the distribution of firm profits. See generally Maister, supra note 126, at 6-9.
137. An associate is defined as one "having subordinate status." BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 121 (6th ed. 1990). Associates are employed by the firm and earn salaries
based upon their contribution to the firm. Any share of the profits in the form of a
bonus paid to associates is largely a matter of discretion with the partnership. Bonuses,
of course, would be considered an expense to the firm.
Historically, firms have grown by adding associates who were recent law school
graduates or who completed a judicial clerkship immediately upon completion of school
prior to joining the firm. Occasionally, firms would hire associates from other firms.
Lateral hiring of partners was less common than lateral hiring of associates. Today,
however, firms may grow and expand in other ways. For example, firms sometimes
selectively hire associates and partners from other firms, or hire wholesale groups of
partners and associates from other firms. Occasionally, large firms essentially buy
smaller firms by merger or acquisition. Compared to traditional methods, such growth
for large firms is not always orderly or in proportion to the existing ratio of associates
to partners. These changes in the composition of the firm sometimes result in major
structural changes which have wide-ranging implications on the performance of the
firm. See generally Bower, supra note 130.
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important measure of firm capacity, the ratio of total lawyers, divided
by the number of equity partners, or "leverage," is also an important
138
indicator of a firm's organizational structure.
Leverage is the means by which the legal skills and marketing ability
of the partners are multiplied.139 By leveraging associates, partners are
able to achieve returns to scale by billing the associates' hours at
multiples of the associates' actual cost to the firm. 40 To the extent
that a firm is able to increase this ratio, its leverage improves. For
firms of equal size as measured by total lawyers, firms with a higher
leverage are thought to be in a position to earn higher profits per
partner. 4"
There is no significant relationship between the pro bono grade and
42
firm size, number of partners, number of associates, or leverage.
Thus, size does not appear to be associated with the amount of pro
bono work performed in large firms. The number of domestic
branches correlates positively and almost significantly with pro
bono;143 therefore, the recent trend to increase domestic branch offices
may be associated with higher pro bono performance. On the other
hand, the number of foreign branches correlates negatively with pro
bono. 144 This relationship suggests that increasing the number of
foreign branches, also a recent trend in global marketing for large
firms,

45

is associated with lower pro bono scores.

The number of paralegals and support staff is also negatively associated with pro bono,' suggesting rather ironically that firms which
138. Maister, supra note 126, at 6-7.
139. Id. Consider two firms, A and B, each having one hundred lawyers. Assume that
firm A has 50 equity partners and that firm B has 25 equity partners. Firm A's leverage
of 2.0 is less than firm B's leverage of 4.0. Thus, firm B is better leveraged than firm A,
which means that partners at firm B can expect higher profits per partner, assuming that
all other factors are equal.
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. See infra app., tbl. 2B. In other words, there is no correlation between pro
bono work and the organizational variables related to the size of large law firms. The
correlation table shows no pattern of association. Thus, any expectation that the
largest of these large firms perform more pro bono service than the other firms is not
supported.
143. See infra app., tbl. 2B. Though not statistically significant, the number of
domestic branches appears to have a positive relationship to pro bono performance.
144. See infra app., tbl. 2B. There is a significant negative relationship between pro
bono performance and the number of foreign law offices for each firm. In other words,
firms with more foreign branches have lower pro bono scores.
145. See Bower, supra note 130, at 49.
146. See infra app., tbl. 2B. In other words, there is a significant negative
relationship between pro bono performance and the number of paralegals and support
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may have a greater potential for productivity may not participate in pro
bono service. Thus, although the relationship between pro bono,
paralegals, and support staff is intriguing, there is very little evidence
of a significant relationship between the pro bono grade and the overall
organizational structure of the firm.
3. Pro Bono and Minority Membership
Increasingly, ethnic minorities and women are pursuing a legal
education.147 Few minority law school graduates, however, become
lawyers with large firms. 148 Where minorities do join large firms,
minority representation appears to be inversely related to pro bono
work; that is, as the number and ratio of minority representation
in the
49
firm increases, the firm's pro bono performance decreases.1
Since pro bono work most often is performed for underprivileged
individuals, and since women, racial minorities, and handicapped
persons historically have enjoyed fewer privileges than others, this
conclusion seems counterintuitive. One possible explanation for this
apparent anomaly relates to behavioral learning. In order to be successful in an organization, members must learn about the aggregate
values and attitudes of the firm, and then must model their behavior
after the group norms. 5 Therefore, if the law firm does not value pro
bono work as a vital part of its social responsibility, then its members,
whatever their gender or ethnicity, may tend to adopt that view upon
being socialized into the firm. In large firms, then, the drive to
succeed and to be accepted may overshadow the individual's sense of
personal professional responsibility.
staff. As the number of paralegals and support staff increases, the pro bono scores
decrease.
147. Steven Keeva, Unequal Partners,A.B.A. J., Feb. 1993, at 50, 54.
148. See Carole Juarez, Minorities in Majority Firms, 55 TEX. B.J. 958 (1992);
Cynthia L. Spanhel & Lori Cook, A Profile of Minority Lawyers in Texas, 55 TEX. B.J.
952 (1992). It is even more rare for a minority attorney to make partner and choose to
remain associated with a large firm in a profession which still remains highly
segregated. Keeva, supra note 147, at 50.
149. See infra app., tbl. 3B. There is a significant negative relationship between the
pro bono grade and the number of female lawyers, the number of African American
lawyers, the number of Asian lawyers, the ratio of African American lawyers in the firm,
the ratio of Asian lawyers in the firm, and the ratio of handicapped lawyers in the firm.
Id. There is a negative, but not significant, relationship between the pro bono grade and
the number of Hispanic lawyers, the number of handicapped lawyers, the ratio of female
lawyers, and the ratio of Hispanic lawyers. Id. Neither the number nor the ratio of
Native American lawyers was related to pro bono work at a significant level. Id.
150.

See generally ALBERT BANDURA, PRINCIPLES OF BEHAVIOR MODIFICATION (1969);

Daniel C. Feldman, The Multiple Socialization of Organization Members, 6 ACAD.
MGMT. REV. 309 (Apr. 1981) (discussing behavioral and attitudinal variables as criteria
for measuring progress in socialization).
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VI. CONCLUSION
For a variety of reasons, there are rumblings that state bar
associations in the future may require its members to perform a set
number of hours of pro bono service annually.' 5' Although attorneys
may owe duties to perform pro bono service for indigent litigants
which are historically,5 2 constitutionally;' 53 practically,'5 4 and
ethically based, 55 as well as need-based, 56 mandating that such
service be made available to indigent civil litigants may raise legitimate
concerns. 57 This empirical Study reveals some interesting implications with respect to the current issues surrounding pro bono.
The Study examined the relationship surrounding pro bono performance and three groups of variables: (1) firm performance; (2)
organizational structure; and (3) minority membership. Firm performance was negatively, and in general, significantly related to pro
bono performance. 5 8 In other words, the performance of more pro
bono service appears to be associated with lower overall firm
performance. Firms with higher pro bono scores appear to earn less
than those firms with lower scores. On the other hand, pro bono performance was not related to firm size; that is, in the population of large
firms, it appears that pro bono service is insensitive to size.159 Of the
eight organizational structure variables, only the number of foreign
branches, paralegals, and support staff were associated with pro bono
performance at a significant level, and these variables were negatively
related. 60 The finding regarding paralegals and support staff is
somewhat discouraging, since firms with more paralegals and support
staff presumably could provide better pro bono service than firms with
less support. Finally, pro bono performance clearly was negatively
related to the representation of minorities in firms. 16' The strong negative correlation between virtually every measure of minority
representation and pro bono performance is surprising. It may be that
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even minority lawyers in large firms are socially removed from the
clients served in pro bono efforts.
Although this Study involves only large firms, and the results may
not be generalized necessarily to firms of all sizes, the one hundred
firms in the study represent the entire population of the largest firms in
the United States. Thus, the inferences made come from examining
these relationships in an entire population, rather than just a random
sample. As such, the inferences provide a strong statistical basis for
generalizing these results to large law firms. The findings of statistical studies gradually and incrementally build a body of knowledge
with respect to the subject analyzed, just as precedents set by courts
gradually and incrementally build a body of law. No one case defines
the law; likewise, no one study defines the subject analyzed. This
undertaking represents, however, an important first step in empirically
testing the presence or absence of associations, as opposed to
presuming their existence or nonexistence without a critical
examination of the relevant data. The bar should determine the most
effective and efficient way to meet its social responsibility of providing
access to justice for people of all socioeconomic classes. Therefore, it
will become increasingly important to explore the relationship between
these and other variables, and the potential practical effect of mandatory pro bono proposals.
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APPENDIX

A. Pro Bono and Large Firm FinancialPerformance
This aspect of the Study considered the following specific firm
performance measures and associated variables: (1) Total revenue:
Total revenues received by the firm for the year less reimbursements
for costs advanced by the firm ("GROSS"); (2) Revenue per lawyer:
Total revenue divided by the total number of lawyers in the firm
("REVLAW"); 6 2 (3) Total cost: Direct and indirect expenses of
associates, support personnel, and paralegals, as well as rent and other
overhead items which reduce the amount ultimately available for
distribution to the partners ("COST"); (4) Cost per lawyer: Total cost
divided by the total number of lawyers in the firm ("COSTLAW"); (5)

Net operating income: Total revenue less total cost, that is, the profit
available for distribution to the partners ("NET"); (6) Profits per
partner: Net operating income divided by the number of partners
("PROF"); 163 and (7) Profit per lawyer: Net operating income divided
by the total number of lawyers in the firm ("PROFLAW"). Table 1A
shows the average performance levels for each level of pro bono
performance, as well as the average firm performance for all firms.
Table 1B shows the correlation of each firm performance variable with
pro bono performance.

162. While total revenue captures the overall output of the firm, this measure is
perhaps the best measure of marginal output.
163. Just as net operating income captures the overall profitability of the firm, this
measure captures the extent to which the overall profitability translates into profits for
the individual partners. However, the measure does not capture the spread among the
partners, that is, the range in profit distribution between the highest and lowest paid
partners. Thus, profit per partner is a measure of centrality not distribution and only
represents the mythical average partner's share.
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TABLE IA
Pro Bono and Firm Performance:* By Pro Bono Performance

Firm
Performance
Variable
GROSS
REVLAW
COST
COSTLAW
NET
PROF
PROFLAW

*

Pro Bono Performance
A

B

C

D

F

Firms

142
.368
91
.22
52
.421
.15

94
.319
63
.21
32
.307
.11

136
.359
88
.23
49
.391
.13

167
.415
106
.26
61
.502
.15

132
.394
87
.26
46
.419
.14

146
.381
93
.24
52
.433
.14

Figures shown are millions of dollars rounded to the nearest million.
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TABLE 1B
Pro Bono and Firm Performance: Correlation
with Pro Bono Performance
Firm Performance Variable
GROSS
REVLAW

COST
COSTLAW
NET

PROF
PROFLAW

**

=p<.01

Correlation with Pro Bono
15
-.
-.37**
-.18
-.31
-.14
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B. ProBono and OrganizationalStructure
This aspect of the Study considered-the following specific measures
of organizational structure and associated variables: (1) Partners:
Number of equity partners in the firm ("PART"); (2) Associates:
Number of associates in the firm ("AsSOC"); (3) Lawyers: Total
number of lawyers, both partners and associates, in the firm
("LWYR"); (4) Leverage: Total number of lawyers in the firm divided
by the number of equity partners in the firm ("LEV"); (5) Domestic
branches: Number of domestic branch offices of the firm in the United
States ("DoM"); (6) Foreign branches: Number of foreign branch
offices of the firm outside of the continental United States ("FOR"); (7)
Paralegals: Number of paralegal assistants employed by the firm
("PARA"); and (8) Support personnel: Number of support personnel,
other than paralegals, employed by the firm ("SUPP").
Table 2A shows the average values of each organizational structure
variable for each level of pro bono performance, as well as for all of
the firms. Table 2B shows the correlation of each organizational
structure variable with pro bono performance.
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TABLE 2A
Pro Bono and Organizational Structure
Organizational
Structure
Variable
LWYR
PART
ASSOC
LEV
DOM
FOR
PARA
SUPP

Pro Bono Performance
A

B

C

D

F

All
Firms

423
141
281
3.0
4.4
1.3
41
314

302
107
196
3.1
4.6
.20
37
271

380
129
251
3.2
3.8
1.7
49
359

394
123
271
3.2
3.6
2.3
58
417

337
115
222
3.0
3.0
2.1
71
417

386
127
259
3.1
3.8
1.8
52
368
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TABLE 2B
Pro Bono and Organizational Structure: Correlation
with Pro Bono Performance
Organizational Structure
Variable
LWYR
PART
ASSOC
LEv
DOM
FOR
PARA
SUPP

**

= p <.01

Correlation with
Pro Bono
-.03
-.00
-. 04

-.06

.18 (p = .09)

-.3 1"*
-.36**
-.28**
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C. ProBono and Minority Membership
This aspect of the Study considered the following specific measures
of minority representation and associated variables: (1) Females:
Number of female lawyers, both partners and associates, in the firm
("FEM"); (2) Female ratio: Ratio of female lawyers to total lawyers in
the firm ("FEM-RATIO"); (3) African Americans: Number of African
American lawyers, both partners and associates, in the firm ("AFAM");
(4) African American ratio: Ratio of African American lawyers to total
lawyers in the firm ("AA-RATIO"); (5) Hispanic: Number of Hispanic
lawyers, both partners and associates, in the firm ("HISP"); (6)
Hispanic ratio: Ratio of Hispanic lawyers to total lawyers in the finn
("HISP-RATIO"); (7) Indian: Number of Native American Indian
lawyers, both partners and associates, in the firm ("IND"); (8) Indian
ratio: Ratio of Native American Indian lawyers to total lawyers in the
firm ("IND-RATIO"); (9) Asian American: Number of Asian American
lawyers, both partners and associates, in the firm ("ASIAN"); (10)
Asian American ratio: Ratio of Asian American lawyers to total
lawyers in the firm ("ASIA-RATIO"); (11) Handicapped: Number of
handicapped lawyers, both partners and associates, in the firm
("HAND"); and (12) Handicapped ratio: Ratio of handicapped lawyers
to total lawyers in the firm ("HAND-RATIO").
Table 3A shows the average minority membership variables for each
level of pro bono performance as well as for all firms. Table 3B
shows the correlation of each minority membership variable with pro
bono performance.
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TABLE 3A
Pro Bono and Minority Representation
Minority
Representation
Variable
FEM
FEM-RATIO

AFAM

AA-RATIO
HISP
HISP-RATIO

INDIAN
IND-RATIO

ASIAN
ASIA-RATIO
HAND
HAND-RATIO

Pro Bono Performance
A
64
.18
4.9
.01
3.1
.01
.33
.00
6.3
.02
.88
.01

B

C

D

F

All
Firms

Pro Bono Publico

1994]

TABLE 3B
Pro Bono and Minority Representation Correlation
with Pro Bono Performance
Minority Representation
Variable
FEM
FEM-RATIO
AFAM
AA-RATIO
HISP
HIsP-RATIO
INDIAN
IND-RATIO
ASIAN
ASIA-RATIO
HAND
HAND-RATIO

=

p < .01
p < .05.

Correlation with
Pro Bono

-.18
-.26**
-.26**
-.15
-.
16
.04
.01
-.23*
-.24*
-.
22
-.28 (p = .07)

